Volume 18

Issue 2

Article 6

1972

Constitutional Law - Due Process - Equal Protection - Consent
Agreement Prohibits State from Excluding Mentally Retarded
Children from Public Education
Alfred J. D'Angelo Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alfred J. D'Angelo Jr., Constitutional Law - Due Process - Equal Protection - Consent Agreement Prohibits
State from Excluding Mentally Retarded Children from Public Education, 18 Vill. L. Rev. 277 (1972).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss2/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

D'Angelo: Constitutional Law - Due Process - Equal Protection - Consent Agr
DECEMBER

1972]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

DUE PROCESS EQUAL PROTECTION CONSENT AGREEMENT PROHIBITS STATE FROM EXCLUDING MENTALLY
RETARDED CHILDREN FROM PUBLIC EDUCATION.

PARC v. Pennsylvania (E.D. Pa. 1972)
The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) initiated a class action to challenge the exclusion of mentally retarded children,
ages six to twenty-one, from Pennsylvania's program of public education.'
PARC claimed that due process and equal protection had been denied the
plaintiffs by the operation of four state statutes. 2 These statutes served
to relieve the state's school system of the obligation to educate children
certified as uneducable by a school psychologist and to place that responsibility upon the state department of welfare.3 PARC sought a declaratory
judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional and an injunction against
4
their enforcement by the class of defendant governmental bodies.
1. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Uncontested testimony indicated that
70,000 to 80,000 retarded children between the ages of 5 and 21 were denied access
to any public education. Id. at 296.
2. PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 13-1304 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 13-1326
(1962) ; PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 13-1330 (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 13-1375
(Supp. 1972).
Section 13-1304 provides in pertinent part:
The board of school directors may refuse to accept or retain beginners who
have not attained a mental age of five years, as determined by the supervisor of
special education or a properly certified public school psychologist in accordance
with standards prescribed by the State Board of Education.
Section 13-1326 provides:
The term "compulsory school age" . . . shall mean the period of a child's life
from the time the child's parents elect to have the child enter school, which shall
be not later than the age of eight (8) years, until the age of seventeen (17)
years.
Section 13-1330 provides:
The provisions of this act requiring regular attendance shall not apply to
any child who(2) Has been examined by an approved mental clinic or by a person certified
as a public school psychologist or psychological examiner, and has been found to
be unable to profit from further public school attendance ....
Section 13-1375 provides:
The State Board of Education shall establish standards for temporary or
permanent exclusion from the public school of children who are found to be
uneducable or untrainable in the public schools. Any child who is reported by
a person who is certified as a public school psychologist as being uneducable and
untrainable in the public schools, . . . shall be certified to the Department of
Public Welfare as a child who is uneducable and untrainable in the public schools.
When a child is thus certified . . . [tihe Department of Public Welfare shall
thereupon arrange for the care, training and supervision of such child in a
manner not inconsistent with the laws governing mentally defective individuals.
3. 343 F. Supp. at 282. The welfare department had no obligation, only
authority. Cf. note 26 and accompanying text infra.
4. 343 F. Supp. at 284. Plaintiffs joined all Pennsylvania school districts as
class defendants.
The plaintiffs sought federal jurisdiction of their claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1970) (all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States have the
right to the full and equal protection and benefit of all laws); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970)
(any individual within the United States who has been deprived of his
rights by any individual (or state), under color of statute, may assert his claim in
an action at law or in equity) ; and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) (district courts have
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A three-judge court was convened, 5 but time was allowed for the
parties to seek a settlement. The parties agreed to stipulate, with the
court's approval, that no child thought to be retarded could be "assigned
(or re-assigned) to either a regular or special educational status, or ex0..."
cluded from a public education without a prior recorded hearing .
After hearing the due process and equal protection arguments, the court
again allowed time for the parties to attempt a settlement. The parties
then submitted a consent agreement which contained not only the above
stipulation, but also a detailed agreement that Pennsylvania could no
longer apply the challenged statutes in a way which deprived retarded
children of free, public education. 7 After notice was given to all members
of plaintiff and defendant classes, a hearing for objections to the agreement
disclosed the procedural objections of one defendant. 8 The court subsequently held: (1) that it had jurisdiction to approve the agreement; (2)
that the agreement was fair; and (3) that the agreement should be implemented. PARC v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
In the past, Pennsylvania had assumed responsibility for the mentally
retarded to the extent of establishing a system of institutions to which
"[a]ny mentally disabled person who desires care in a facility may make
appropriate application directly to any facility willing and able to receive
him .

. . ."9

While the individual had the primary financial responsibility

for the care received in such an institution, 10 once the individual had exhausted his resources under private and public assistance programs, the
Commonwealth and the local counties were required to assume and to
share the costs."
As the court in the instant case explained, residential centers had
been established in 1848 to prepare mentally retarded children for a
greater contribution to society; special education classes for the mentally retarded had been started in public schools in 1900.12 Thus, there

had been a recognition by the state that retarded children needed some
original jurisdiction over any action commenced to redress the deprivation, under
color of any state statute, of any rights secured by any act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens). Thus, PARC argued that the Pennsylvania statutes
in question deprived retarded children of their rights and that the district court
therefore had original jurisdiction over this action.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) permits an injunction against the operation of a
state statute on grounds of unconstitutionality only after such application is heard
by a district court of three judges.
6. 343 F. Supp. at 284-85. This stipulation had the effect of settling the due
process issue. See notes 35-66 and accompanying text infra.
7. 343 F. Supp. at 306. For a discussion of the subsequently modified interpretations of the statutes, see note 24 infra. The agreement had the effect of
settling the equal protection issue. See notes 39-49 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text infra.
9. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 4401 (1969).
10. Id. §4501.
11. Id. § 4503.
12. 343 F. Supp. at 294. One of a panel of experts (see note 42 infra), Professor
Ignacy Goldberg, demonstrated that the history of the treatment of the mentally retarded indicated that these functions were assumed by the state as an accommodation
to retarded persons and not as a legal obligation. Id.
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special program of education, but no clear obligation to provide it had
been recognized.
The Public School Code of 194913 made provision for the special
treatment of certain classes of children other than the mentally retarded.
Section 13-1372 provided that "[t] he State Board of Education shall adopt
and prescribe standards and regulations for the proper education and
training of all exceptional children by school districts or counties singly or
jointly.' 1 4 Such exceptional children included children who deviated from
the average as provided in section 13-1371.15 Sections 13-1373 and 131373.1 provided that local schools were to be reimbursed by the state for
special education readers, supplies, aids, and books for any child "between
the ages of six and twenty-one years of age [sic] who is blind, partially
sighted, deaf, hard of hearing, or afflicted with cerebral palsy .... -16 Section 13-1376 provided that the Commonwealth would pay 75 per cent (the
school district to pay the other 25 per cent) of the cost of maintaining a
child, who is blind, deaf, suffering from cerebral palsy or brain damage,
in any of the approved educational institutions for the blind, deaf, cerebral
palsied, or brain damaged children. 17 Thus, the mentally retarded apparently have not been included among brain-damaged children or any of the
other classes.' Rather, they have been declared uneducable and therefore
excluded from public educational services under section 13-1375,19 a
procedure which did not apply to the other classes of children who were
treated separately under the Code. 20 The mentally retarded, as well as
being excluded, could also be refused admittance to public schools, under
section 13-1304,21 on the basis that they had not attained a mental age
of five. Again, since the Code provided specially and separately for braindamaged children, it was unlikely that the section 13-1304 barrier would
22
be applied to them.
13.

PA. STAT. tit.

14. PA.

STAT.

24, §§ 1-101 et seq. (1962).

tit. 24, § 13-1372 (Supp. 1972).

15. PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 13-1371 (Supp. 1972), states:
The term "exceptional children" shall mean children of school age who
deviate from the average in physical, mental, emotional, or social characteristics
to such an extent that they require special educational facilities or services ....
Cf. notes 17 & 18 infra, indicating that the mentally retarded were not included as
"exceptional children" and, hence, were susceptible to exclusion under section 13-1375.
See note 19 and accompanying text infra.
16. PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 13-1373, 13-1373.1 (Supp. 1972).
17. Id. § 13-1376.

18. The court cited a 1965 Pennsylvania study on mental retardation which stated
that there was no state-provided program suitable for "uneducable" children. Their
normal fate was a waiting list for special classes. 343 F. Supp. at 297. Cf. note 1
supra.

19. PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 13-1375 (Supp. 1972). See note 2 supra.
20. The defendants had stipulated that the named plaintiffs were being excluded.
343 F. Supp. at 282 n.2. Since the consent agreement provided that the mentally
retarded be included within the class of children suffering from brain damage as
provided by section 13-1376, it may be deduced that they were not so treated previous
to the agreement.
21. PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 13-1304 (Supp. 1972). See note 2 supra.
22. See note 20 supra.
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In the instant case, the consent agreement established Pennsylvania's
obligation to place a retarded child in a free, public program of education
commensurate with the child's abilities and limited the applicability of the
exclusionary statutes so as not to deny a retarded child the opportunity for
a public education. In particular, the mentally retarded were to be included
23
in the brain-damaged category.
In accordance with the stipulated agreement, the Attorney General of
Pennsylvania was to issue opinions interpreting these statutes.2 4 The
defendants were required to submit a plan to court-appointed Masters, to
be effectuated by September 1, 1972. This plan was to specify programs
for retarded children, arrangements for financing, location of the training,
and such additional teachers as would be required.2 5 The Pennsylvania
Department of Welfare was obligated to educate anyone, subject to a
hearing, whom a school psychologist determined to be "a mentally retarded
child [who] would benefit more from placement in a program of education and training administered by the Department ....-20 This obligation was to be supervised by the Department of Education, which was
responsible for the placement of every retarded child in a program of
education appropriate to his or her abilities.
The district court put the force of law behind the agreement by:
(1) enjoining the defendant class from using the statutes in question to
exclude retarded children from public schools; (2) ordering the defendant
class to provide facilities for the education of retarded children; and (3)
ordering that notice be given and hearings held before any change is made
in the educational status of a child thought to be retarded.2 7
Because the court's approval of the agreement had the effect of binding all members of the defendant class 2 8 as if the agreement were a con-

tested judgment, several procedural objections to the approval were raised,
though the fairness of the agreement was not contested.29 In order to meet
these objections, as well as to satisfy itself of its proper authority, the court
first determined that there was a justiciable controversy, in spite of the
23. 343 F. Supp. at 286-87.
24. Cf. note 2 supra. In light of the court's decision, section 13-1304 must now
be interpreted to mean only that a school district may refuse entrance to one who has
not attained a mental age of five in the regular school system (as opposed to a special
school system). Section 13-1375 must now be interpreted to mean only that the welfare
department must arrange education programs for retarded children. Section 13-1330
must now be interpreted to mean only that a parent may be excused from criminal
liability if the parent elects, with the permission of the school board, to withdraw
the child from school. Section 13-1326 may no longer be used to limit a retarded
child's education to the ages of eight through seventeen. In addition, the agreement
included retarded children under section 13-1376 which provides for state payment
of tuition to one suffering from brain damage who attends a private school.
25. 343 F. Supp. at 288.

26. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 303-04.
28. See note 4 supra.

29. The court noted that the parties agreed to minor modifications of the original
agreement, but the modifications had no effect on the impact of the agreement. 343
F. Supp. at 290 n.28.
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fact that the parties had eventually reached agreement. s0 In addition, it
rejected the argument that it should abstain on grounds that state courts
should resolve unclear state law 3 ' and that the equal protection issue was
an unnecessary constitutional decision.A2 The court further determined
that it possessed jurisdiction over all members of the defendant class, 3
since the defendants had received adequate notice of the proceeding and
had been given an opportunity to appear, 4 and since the interests of the
class had been adequately protected by the Attorney General in the early
stages of litigation. 8 This evaluation seems to have been appropriate, especially in light of the fact that all the defendants were governmental bodies
deriving their power and interest in the litigation from the Public School
7
Code, 86 a part of which was already being defended by the state itself.
The final obstacle to the court's approval of the agreement was a
determination of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction depended
upon the existence of a colorable claim that the plaintiffs had been denied
equal protection and due process. Once a prima facie case was established
30. One defendant claimed that no controversy existed once the parties reached
an agreement and urged the court to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

However, since the defendants refused to concede the statutes' unconstitutionality,
arguably a controversy remained. The court relied on the fact
is established, jurisdiction is not lost by settlement, stating:
[T]he plaintiffs have established a colorable constitutional
the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
established, we then have the judicial power necessary to
a settlement agreement. See Kelly v. Greer, 365 F.2d 669

that once jurisdiction
claim . . . and hence
Once jurisdiction is
approve and enforce
(3d Cir. 1966), cert.

denied, 385 U.S. 1035 (1967) ....

Id. at 288 n.19.
31. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In Pullman, the
company sought to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the railroad commission
claiming that it violated Texas law. The Supreme Court ordered the district court
to abstain but to retain jurisdiction until the parties had an opportunity to obtain
a decision in the state court. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 196-97 (2d ed. 1970). The abstention doctrine applies only where the issue
of state law is uncertain. See also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 438
(1971) ; notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text infra.
32. The court conceded that the statutes challenged were unclear and as yet
uninterpreted by Pennsylvania courts. Had no consent agreement been involved,
the court would have abstained on the equal protection question and would have ruled
solely on the due process question. 343 F. Supp. at 299. However, since the court
was not required to rule on the constitutionality of the statutes, it avoided making a
needless constitutional decision which might be obviated by a subsequent state decision.
Cf. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bazanick, 397 U.S. 82
(1970) ; Reid v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1971).
33. A class action is permitted where the representative parties will "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4). The court
determines if the class is valid and such a determination may be conditional. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1), In PARC, the court determined that the class action could be
maintained subject to the objections of the members of the defendant class. One
defendant's objection based on Rule 23 was denied because its interests had been
adequately represented. 343 F. Supp. at 292-93.
34. 343 F. Supp. at 292.
35. Id. at 292-93.
36. PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 2-211 (1962).
37. Id.

The Attorney-General

was already representing the state and state

officials in defending §§ 13-1304 & 13-1375 which were attacked as unconstitutional
on their face. See note 2 supra.
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that rights under sections 1981 and 1983 had been denied, the district
8
court would have jurisdiction to redress the deprivationa
Plaintiffs' equal protection argument was two-pronged: (1) no rational basis existed for excluding retarded children; and (2) education
is a fundamental interest requiring the state to show a compelling interest
before any exclusion.8 9 The rational basis test requires that once a state
holds its services open to an entire class - for example, all children - it
cannot exclude any subdivision of the class arbitrarily; rather, there must
be some rational basis for the exclusion. 40 PARC asserted that Pennsylvania had undertaken to guarantee an education to children between the
ages of six and twenty-one 41 and that, for the state to exclude a child
from the class of educable children, it had to show a rational basis. The
court found PARC's argument to be colorable as a result of uncontested
expert testimony 42 on the educability of virtually all retarded children.
Paragraph four of the consent agreement incorporated this testimony:
[A]ll mentally retarded persons are capable of benefiting from a
program of education and training [and] the greatest number of
retarded persons, given such education and training, are capable of
achieving self-sufficiency and the remaining few, with such education
and training are capable of achieving some degree of self-care . . .43
Thus, by raising sufficient doubts as to the rationale for the current standard
of exclusion, 44 PARC placed the burden upon the state to justify the
exclusion. Since the state did not meet this burden prior to the hearings,
the court found a colorable claim and from the standpoint of the evidence
presented to it, jurisdiction was properly assumed.
A similar rational basis argument was used in an analogous situation
in New York. In McMillan v. Board of Education,45 an action was
brought on behalf of three children suffering from brain damage, challeng38. See note 4 supra. A court must only determine if the evidence presented at
the hearings demonstrates that the plaintiffs have been denied the equal benefit of the
law (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970)), and that the equal benefit was denied by the operation
of a state statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
39. 343 F. Supp. at 283.
40. See Developments in the Law -

Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065,

1082 (1969).
41. PARC relied on PA. STAT. tit. 24, § 13-1301 (1962), which states:
Every child being a resident of any school district, between the ages of six
(6) and twenty-one (21) years, may attend the public schools in his district subject
to the provisions of this Act.
42. Among those testifying were: Professor Burton Blatt, Division of Special
Education and Rehabilitation, Syracuse University; James Gallagher, First Director
of the Bureau of Education for Handicapped Children and Associate Commissioner
of Education, United States Office of Education; Professor Ignacy Goldberg, Department of Special Education, Columbia University; and Professor Donald Steadman,
Chairman of the Division of Human Development, School of Education, University
of North Carolina. 343 F. Supp. at 285.
43. Id. at 296.

44. Plaintiffs did not contest the propriety of specially classifying retarded children
for educational purposes. Their equal protection argument was aimed at the complete
denial of public education to retarded children. See 343 F. Supp. at 297.
45. 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970).
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ing a New York statute which provided that, if handicapped children could
not receive adequate public instruction, the state would pay for private
education up to $2000 per year. 40 Plaintiffs claimed that no rational basis
existed for this ceiling. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of the action and remanded with the following question:
Granted that a state which gives financial aid for the private education
of handicapped children unable to attend classes in public schools may
have to establish some maximum .

.

. since the cost of private educa-

tion of a child with a particular constellation of handicaps might be
astronomical, is there a rational basis for a ceiling lower than the cost
that would have been incurred in maintaining the child in the most
closely related type of public school class ?7
The court thus found the plaintiffs' argument colorable, though it was
necessary to remand the case in order to give the state an opportunity to
establish a rational basis for its ceiling.
PARC's challenge was arguably more colorable than the challenge
presented in McMillan. PARC challenged the state's ability to exclude
retarded children entirely from public education, while in McMillan, the
challenge went merely to the state's right to impose a ceiling on aid granted
to handicapped children. 48 Consequently, the district court appears to
have been correct in concluding that a colorable controversy existed over
which it had jurisdiction.

49

The second prong of plaintiffs' equal protection argument alleged
that education was a fundamental interest requiring that a compelling
state interest be shown before education could be denied.5 0 However, the
46. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4407 (McKinney 1970).
47. 430 F.2d at 1149-50 (citations omitted).
48. It may also be noted that the New York statute provided special education
for handicapped children. The plaintiffs challenged only the cost ceiling while in
PARC, plaintiffs contested, in a sense, the inadequate amount of special education
for the mentally retarded.
49. It could be argued, however, that the state in McMillan had undertaken the
education of retarded children and therefore could not set an arbitrarily low ceiling
of support for fiscal reasons, while in PARC the state might have other rational
reasons for wholly excluding retarded children.
50. Plaintiffs' advantage in having education declared a fundamental interest
was that, under the compelling interest test, the state had to show that a proper
public purpose had been undertaken and that it had adopted the least detrimental of
possible alternatives. Under the rational basis test, the burden is on the individual
to show that the state's action bore no relevant relation to its aims. See Houle,
Compelling State Interest v. Mere Rational Classification: The Practitioner'sEqual
Protection Dilemma, 3 URBAN LAW. 375, 376-77 (1971). See also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
There were previous decisions which held that education is fundamental,
but they also involved considerations of race and/or wealth. See, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments . . . . Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.") ; Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971) (The California Supreme Court struck down California's use of the property
tax as a means of financing neighborhood schools and declared education, in connection
with wealth, a fundamental interest since wealth is an inherently suspect classification,
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three-judge panel did not decide the fundamental interest question. Once
the court determined that the plaintiffs had a colorable argument under
the rational basis test, it had established the jurisdictional basis necessary
to approve the equal protection aspect of the consent agreement 51 and,
hence, it properly expressed no opinion as to plaintiffs' proposed applica53
tion52 of the compelling state interest doctrine.
In addition to the equal protection argument, the plaintiffs also alleged
that the four statutes in question 54 violated, in the particular manner of
exclusion, the excluded children's rights to due process. Here, again, the
agreement obviated the need to judge the validity of plaintiffs' argument.
Rather, the court had to satisfy itself only that PARC's contention was
colorable. 5
PARC based its due process argument on uncontested facts introduced at the hearing. The court noted that "prior to this suit, parents of
retarded children who are plaintiffs were not afforded a hearing or, in
many instances, even notice of their child's exclusion from public school." 5"
Plaintiffs asserted that due process required both notice and a hearing
before any child could be classified as uneducable. They presented two
supporting arguments: (1) the label of mental retardation was a stigma
and, as such, should not be attached without notice to the parents and an
opportunity to challenge the labelling;57 and (2) education, as a fundamental interest, should not be frustrated without notice of the impending
58
deprivation and a chance to be heard.
necessitating that inequalities be justified by a compelling state interest).

PARC

asked the court to declare education, alone, a public interest without any connection
to race or wealth.
51. The equal protection aspect of the agreement concerned the resolution of the
disparity of treatment between mentally retarded children and others, by providing for
public education in both cases. 343 F. Supp. at 307.
52. The court stated:
But we are satisfied that the plaintiffs have established a colorable constitutional claim even under the less stringent rational basis test, and consequently
we need not decide whether the Commonwealth must demonstrate a compelling
state interest in order to dispose of the narrow issues presently before us.
Id. at 283 n.8.
53. Plaintiffs' argument has its roots in the importance of education in society.
As one writer stated:
[T]he pivotal position of education to success in American society and its essential
role in opening up to the individual the central experiences of our culture lend
it an importance that is undeniable.
Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1129 (1969).
While the district court in PARC properly refrained from deciding the
fundamental interest issue, the United States Supreme Court has indicated its
inclination on the issue in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1969). Dandridge
seems to limit the area of fundamental interest to express constitutional guarantees and
to such areas as have previously been declared fundamental, for example, the right
to travel. Hence, education, as a fundamental interest, may be limited to situations
involving the additional element of discrimination according to race or wealth. Cf.
note 50 supra.
54. See note 2 supra.
55. See text accompanying note 38, supra.
56. 343 F. Supp. at 293.
57. Id. at 292-94.
58. Id. at 295 n.48.
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PARC's first contention was based upon the serious social effects
accompanying the stigma of mental retardation. 59 The court noted PARC's
citation of studies indicating that schools frequently imposed the mental
retardation label and all too often imposed the label incorrectly. 60 The
court acknowledged the dangers involved where the state, through the
public schools, could place such a label upon a child without procedural
safeguards. Consequently, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had
produced a colorable due process argument to sustain jurisdiction in
approving the consent stipulation relating to due process. 61
The United States Supreme Court has made it quite clear that if a
label is a stigma, it cannot be imposed without due process of law. In
62
Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a Wisconsin statute providing for the posting of a notice which forbade
the retail sale of liquor to the person named in the notice because that
person was deemed dangerous to the peace of the community. The Court
termed the notice "a stigma, an official branding of a person" 68 without
affording the individual any notice or hearing prior to being labelled a
danger. The Constantineau Court emphasized:
Only when the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of an un64
savory label on a person are aired can oppressive results be prevented.
In an earlier case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, noted:
[T]he right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous
loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.6 5
Thus, the stigma need not be a criminal label. Rather, due process is
violated when the state seeks to place a label of disgrace upon an individual
without proper procedural safeguards.6 6 As a result, it is doubtful that
59. Testimony was given at the August 12, 1971 hearing by Professor Ignacy
Goldberg on the stigma attached to mental retardation. He reviewed the history
of mental retardation, indicating that the mentally retarded have been considered
idiots, potential criminals, and prostitutes, and that some states have even provided
for compulsory sterilization of retarded men and women. Professor Goldberg indicated
that progress had been made in education, but the stigma remained. Id. at 294.
60. Id. at 295. Testimony indicated that 25 per cent of the children diagnosed as
retarded had been incorrectly diagnosed. 343 F. Supp. at 295.
61. Id. The stipulation provided for notice and hearings before a child's educational status could be changed. It also gave a right to retain counsel and confront
witnesses.
62. 400 U.S. 433 (1970). The three-judge panel in PARC relied upon Constantineau in finding the due process argument to be colorable. 343 F. Supp. at 295.
63. 400 U.S. at 437.
64. Id.
65. Anti-Facist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
66. Constantineau relied on the infringement upon the liberty of the individual
as a basis for invoking due process. Similarly, in PARC, the stigma at least
colorably infringes upon the liberty of the retarded child by limiting his future
development and self-sufficiency.
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the state may label a child mentally retarded without first notifying the
parents or guardian and then giving them an opportunity to appear at a
hearing in the child's behalf. The court, therefore, properly concluded that
PARC's argument was colorable and that it had jurisdiction to approve
67
the stipulation.
The second aspect of plaintiffs' due process contention was that education was a fundamental interest and, as such, could not be frustrated
without an opportunity to be heard. 68 To support their second argument,
plaintiffs cited several cases indicating that denying a child a public education could be sufficient to require due process, even without the stigma
rationale. One of the strongest cases cited was Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education69 in which the Fifth Circuit stated that "[w]henever
a governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the Constitution
requires that the act be consonant with the due process of law." 70 Dixon
concerned due process requirements necessary before the expulsion of a
student. It is certainly plausible to argue that, if due process requires
hearings before exclusion resulting from misconduct, it would also require
hearings before an exclusion resulting from a mental condition unaccompanied by misconduct.
As with the equal protection arguments, the court declined to evaluate
this second due process argument because jurisdiction over the issue was
sufficiently established by finding the first argument colorable. Such an
approach seems especially appropriate in light of the fact that the basic
question - whether education is a fundamental interest - is the same as
71
in the equal protection context.
Other non-criminal areas in which due process has required a hearing
before any reassignment of status are involuntary commitment to mental
institutions 72 and termination of welfare benefits. 73 In Dixon v. Attorney
General,74 the court required Pennsylvania to provide hearings prior to
involuntary commitment to a mental institution. Thus, Pennsylvania did
not ignore the interests of mentally retarded persons when compelling their
admission to an institution.
67. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
68. The court considered this argument only in passing. See 343 F. Supp. at
295 n.48.
69. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cited in 343 F. Supp. at 295 n.43. The circuit
court concluded that due process required notice and an opportunity for a hearing
before students at a tax-supported university could be expelled for misconduct. 294
F.2d at 158.
70. 294 F.2d at 155.
71. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra.
72. In Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971), inmates
of a state hospital attacked the constitutionality of a statute which allowed commitment without consulting the individuals or their families and without providing for
a legal determination that the individuals required hospital care. The district court
held that the commitment statute violated due process and approved a consent
agreement establishing procedures to be followed in the future.
73. See text accompanying notes 75-76 infra.
74. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In Goldberg v. Kelly, 75 the United States Supreme Court declared that,
before welfare benefits could be halted, due process required "that a
recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a
proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and
evidence orally."7 6 In PARC, while the court naturally gave no indication
as to exactly what procedures would be necessary, the amended stipula77
tion provided for procedures similar to those required in Goldberg.
The stipulation gives the parents the right to legal representation, 7 but it
makes no provision for state-provided counsel for the destitute. Thus, the
stipulated due process requirements may be less meaningful for lower
income groups. 79 However, since the court was not called upon to determine whether due process required the presence of counsel at such a
hearing, the court properly approved the stipulation without commenting
on the provision for counsel.
By satisfying itself of the colorability of both the due process and
equal protection arguments, the court established its jurisdiction over the
controversy. Thus, the court properly approved the agreement and issued
an injunction against applying the statutes other than as provided by the
agreement. The injunction has the important consequence of relieving
PARC of the burden of insuring compliance with the terms of the agreement, since the court can invoke its contempt power to require compliance
with any of the provisions. After September 1, 1972, PARC utilized the
court's continuing authority, when it asked the three-judge panel to order
the Philadelphia School Board to comply with the consent agreement,
which that city had not yet put into effect. On October 6, 1972, the court
ordered the Philadelphia School Board to comply by January 2, 1973.80
75. 397 U.S. 254 (1970), cited in 343 F. Supp. at 295 n.48.
76. 397 U.S. at 267-68. However, the Goldberg Court indicated that recipients
were not entitled to state-provided counsel.
77. Since the court did not judge the case on the full merits, it was not called
upon to determine whether particular procedures would be required to satisfy due
process. The stipulation on the due process issue provided simply for notice and
a hearing. Cf. text accompanying note 6 supra.

78. 343 F. Supp. at 304. The stipulation stated:
The notice shall inform the parent or guardian of his right to be represented at
the hearing by any person of his choosing, including legal counsel ....
79. Since mentally retarded children in higher income groups may avail themselves of private facilities, they may have little need for the provisions made under
this decision. It is suggested that those who will have to place greatest reliance
upon this decision are the lower income groups who are wholly dependent on the
public schools for education, but they are least likely to be able to afford counsel
at the hearings which will determine the availability of public education. Dissenting in
Goldberg, Justice Black expressed a similar thought and called the right to counsel
as provided by the Goldberg majority, meaningless, since oftentimes such people are
too poor to retain counsel. Similarly, the right to counsel may prove meaningless to
many parents of retarded children who cannot afford counsel.
80. Philadelphia Daily News, Oct. 11, 1972, at 72, col. 1. The District Court
has given the Philadelphia Board a four month extension to comply with the PARC
decision. The court apparently recognized the financial and administrative problems
facing Philadelphia's educational system.
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